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In the last year, a concensus has developed in the United States
about the need for economic revitalization. The economic performance of
the past decade is increasingly seen as a disaster. By historical stan-
dards and in comparison to the rest of the world, labor productivity has
declined and economic growth has faltered; we face high, and apparently
rising, rates of unemployment and inflation. Our competitive position in
international markets has deteriorated; our own markets are being invaded
by imports and the survival of major industries such as steel and autos
appears to be at stake. This situation has been characterized by Presi-
dent Reagan as an economic crisis comparable to that of the Great Depress-
ion. The single most prevalent explanation for the crisis is the expan-
sion of governmental activity: rising expenditures, over indulgent social
welfare programs and extensions of federal regulatory activities. The
Reagan prescription for the crisis is a retreat of government in all of
these areas. Reagan's policy proposals thus involve a major reversal of
postwar trends in government activity. These proposals are distinguished
largely by the vigor and drama with which they are being pursued. The
understandings which underly this policy were shared by the Carter
administration and propagandized by its rhetoric.
These understandings, however, are incomplete. They neglect two
principle features of the current economic situation. When these are
recognized, a very different interpretation emerges. The first of these
neglected features is that the U.S. is not the only country whose economic
performance has deteriorated over the past decade. All industrial coun-
tries have performed poorly by historical standards and especially by the
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standards of earlier postwar decades. The deterioration is arguably less
dramatic abroad than it is in the United States, but even this is not
uniformly true. One of the reasons that foreign competition appears all
of a sudden to pose such a threat is that other countries have sought to
escape the weakness of their domestic markets through expansions abroad.
To the extent that we succeed in recapturing our own markets, therefore,
we will aggravate the problem of our principle allies, transforming our
economic crisis into an international political one. If there is really a
crisis, it would thus seem to be not simply an American crisis but a
crisis of Western capitalism. As such, it cannot be resolved through the
revitalization of our own industries; but none of the programs which have
been put forth are addressed to the international economic order.
The second feature which the conventional diagnosis neglects is that
the failures of policy have very little to do with the governmental
institutions being attacked and eliminated. The greatest government
failings have been in its efforts to maintain economic stability and to
promote equality of economic opportunity for underpriviledged and disad-
vantaged groups. The governmental activities which have been under the
most severe attack, and are now being sharply curtailed, namely governmen-
tal efforts to promote health and safety through regulation of the private
sector and to maintain minimal living standards have in fact been rela-
tively successful. The expansion of governmental activities in these
areas, (and their success) has been blamed for the failure of government
to achieve its more traditional goals, but the relationship between these
different activities is in no sense self-evident. A diagnosis based upon
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some particular failing of government would be more convincing, moreover,
were it not that the other major economic institutions have failed to
achieve their own goals. Thus, for example, the American automobile and
steel industries have lost a large part of the domestic market to foreign
competition because they have made erroneous decisions about product de-
sign and productive technology. The trade union movement has made serious
tactical errors and as a result has lost the major political battles in
the decade. It has experienced a progressive decline in membership and
failed to make major organizing breakthroughs. Although all of these
institutions have looked to government to help them escape from their own
failures and, in so doing, have sought to implicate the government in
their errors, the causal link between governmental failures and those of
individual industries and unions are obscure. It would seem more natural
to look for reasons which explain why so many different institutions are
simultaneously unable to function effectively by their ox^n standards . Ad
hoc explanations based upon moral failings, deteriorating incentive struc-
tures or the stupidity of one or another decision-maker do not seem very
convincing given the pervasive nature of the problem, the very different
types of institutions affected, and the proven effectiveness of these same
institutions and many of their leaders in the past.
This paper is an attempt to explain the current economic problems in
the United States which recognizes both the international nature of the
crisis and the pervasive failings of our economic institutions, private as
well as governmental.
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The Theory of Regulation
The basic argument is framed in terms of a view of capitalist econom-
ic development originating in France known as la theorie de la regulation .
Most of its proponents are Marxist but in several respects the theory
constitutes an integration of Marxist and conventional theories. The
version developed here departs in places from the original in order to
reflect the peculiarities of the American experience and to incorporate
additional theoretical ideas which close the argument where it is other-
wise incomplete,^
The argument here starts from the notion that economic growth in a
capitalist economy is dependent upon the progressive specialization of
productive tasks. ^ It is from this specialization that the innovation and
rising productivity which we associate with modernity derive. The
specialization is, in turn, dependent upon the steady expansion of demand.
The central notion in the theory of regulation is that in normal times
that expansion is ensured by a series of internal equilibriating mechan-
isms which coordinate the economic system and maintain a balance among its
constituent elements. The classical example of such a mechanism is the
price system, as it is understood in conventional neoclassical theory.
Other mechanisms of this type are the monetary system and the automatic
stabilizers of Keynesian economics. These mechanisms are called regula-
tors ; the theory itself takes its title from that term.
The system of regulation is embedded in a series of institutions
which are adapted to a particular historical period in the evolution of
the economy. Since capitalist economies must continually expand and since
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that expansion implies qualitative change as well—and indeed since the
basic task of a regulatory system is to ensure that these changes take
place—the economy eventually outgrows a given regulatory system. The
institutional structure is increasingly incapable of maintaining the con-
stituent elements of the system in balance. The accumulating imbalance
lead to an economic crisis. The crisis can be resolved, and stable eco-
nomic growth restored, only by the development of a new institutional
structure capable of regulating the system in its altered state. The
basic argument of this literature is that the Great Depression of the
1930's was such a crisis in the history of capitalist development. It was
ultimately resolved through the creation in the immediate postwar period
of a new set of regulatory mechanisms. These constituted the foundation
of the postwar prosperity. In the last decade, it has become increasingly
apparent that the economic system has outgrown these postwar mechanisms:
The present economic problems are, thus, viewed as symptoms of a new
crisis in capitalist development, comparable to that of the Great
Depression, which can only be resolved through global institutional
innovation. The central questions to which this theory leads are
What was the regulatory structure of the postwar period? What changes in
the underlying economic structure have rendered the existing regulatory
structure ineffective? And what kinds of new regulatory structures might
enable us to escape from the current crisis?
The body of the text develops the answers to these questions. The
argument there may be summarized as follows:
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The Postwar Regulatory System: A Resume
The postwar regulatory system is characterized by the term Fordism or
Neo-Fordism, The term refers to the constellation of marketing, produc-
tion, and labor policies developed by Henry Ford between 1908 and 1914 and
symbolized by the Model T, the mass production assembly line, and the
$5.00 day. The essential idea is that the system is dominated by large
scale mass production industries operating in relatively closed national
economies. The regulatory structure was essentially designed to ensure
that the demand for the output of these mass consumption industries would
expand at a rate equivalent to their expanding productive capacity. The
central institutional element has been an industrial relations system
which makes money wages throughout the economy rise at a rate roughly
equivalent to productivity gains plus inflation. The basic formula is
established in key settlements reached between the large corporations and
industrial unions in the mass consumption industries and then spread to
the rest of the economy through pattern bargaining, administrative
practice and legislation. The system is dependent upon a relatively
permissive monetary policy which validates these wage settlements. It has
also been a system in which relative, as well as absolute, prices are
comparatively rigid. Prices cannot therefore function effectively as
allopative mechanisms and the system has been dependent upon abundant
labor reserves and raw materials available on call at or below prevailing
prices and wages. These supplies, moreover, have come from closely tied,
and relatively poor, regions or countries, a fact which has insured that
funds spent upon them are immediately recycled through the domestic
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economy and thus do not constitute a leakage of aggregate demand.
The current crisis of the system is produced by the fact that the
national economies which compose the capitalist world have now developed
to the point where further expansion can no longer be contained within
relatively closed national markets. Internal demand, fed by the expanding
wages of the industrial labor force, is in other words no longer
sufficient to absorb the output which modern industry, if able freely to
change productive technique and industrial organization, and to expand at
the rate required to justify such changes, would produce. The crisis has
thus brought the major industrial producers into direct competition with
each other for mass markets, and the problems of the American automobile,
steel and electronics industries are the heart of the present crises of
world capitalism. The pressures upon existing labor management arrange-
ments are also symptomatic of this crisis in the sense that arrangements
which were once central to the economic well-being of the nation as a
whole and of the business community itself, no longer have very much to
do with economic prosperity. Renewed world economic prosperity, compar
able to that which the Western industrial world experienced in the 1950 's
and 1960's, would require the development of a new regulatory system.
In addition to this basic regulatory crisis, the regulatory system in
the United States has experienced a number of other strains since the
middle 1960's. Among these were the organization of public employees and
the growing power of the construction unions in the middle and late
1960's, which upset bargaining patterns and displaced the mass consumption
industries as the key wage settlements; the exhaustion of domestic labor
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reserves and the revolt of the black labor force, which had constituted
the major element of flexibility in the labor market; the raw material
shortages, especially the continuing fuel crisis; and the growing economic
and political independence of raw material supplies in the third world.
These problems might be termed institutional crises in the same sense that
they called into question particular institutional components of the
postwar regulatory structure. They did not, however, call into question
the efficacy of the structure itself.
Many—arguably all—of these institutional problems were the
outgrowth of a broader social crisis which manifest itself in the late
1960's and early 1970's. In the United States, this social crisis gave
rise to the civil rights movement and to the student revolt against the
war in Vietnam and the materialistic base of bourgeois society. That
crisis is often viewed as the beginning of the economic crisis. The
present situation is then seen as a continuation of problems which began
to manifest themselves at that time.
The argument we are developing is not consistent with that view. It
implies a very sharp conceptual distinction between the difficulties of
the two periods. The social crisis of the earlier period occurred, and
was more or less successfully resolved, within the postwar regulatory
mode. This was so not only in the sense that, as we have just argued, the
economic problems of the era were problems of particular institutional
components of the system and not of the system as a whole. But also in
the sense that other institutional reforms, such as the expansion of the
welfare and public assistance systems and the "war on poverty," which were
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directly responsive to the social pressures of the period, were conceived
in terms of the postwar regulatory mode and designed to be consistent with
the institutional structure which housed it. If many of those reforms now
appear to be ill-conceived and misguided, it is because that regulatory
structure is itself no longer viable. That was not apparent—and
problably not even true—at the time.
President's Reagan's economic policy embodies this confusion. One of
its central components is the elimination of the social programs
instituted in the 1960 's and many of the social reforms of the 1930 's as
well. If our current economic difficulties constitute a crisis of
regulation, however, this approach will simply regenerate the social
pressures which the programs were designed to relieve, without elevating
the economic difficulties. For the latter it is necessary first to
conceive of a new mode of regulation and then to construct an
institutional structure which will implement it.
From this point-of-view, the central component of Reagan's policy is
the effort to restore the price system and the competitive market place as
the central regulatory institutions. It is, however, very difficult to
see how these respond to the contemporary regulatory problem as it is
presently emerging. The most obvious solution to that problem is the
institution on a multinational scale of a system analogous to those which
maintained the demand, and sustained the expansion of, the domestic
economies of the major industrial nations in the earlier post war period.
This solution is obvious in the sense that the several national systems
provide a clear concept of what such a mode of regulation might look like.
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By the same token, however, we can also see clearly what it would mean to
be moving in the direction of realizing such an alternative and there are
very few signs of such movement. Instead of the creation of larger, more
homogeneous and expansive world markets which such movement would require,
we seem in fact to be moving in the opposite direction toward increasingly
small, fragmented and uncertain market situations. These situations give
a special advantage to small producers using flexible technologies and
skilled workers in a mode of operation which is in direct contrast to the
mass production techniques which previously dominated postwar markets.
This development could be simply another symptom of the crisis itself, a
response to the flux and uncertainty which it has introduced into the
basic parameters of economic decisions. But it may also be indicative of
new technological trends and an alternative mode of economic regulation.
The very last section of this paper is devoted to a discussion of what
these might be and what they would imply for an evaluation of American
economic policy.
This interpretation growing out of the theory of regulation can be
contrasted to theories of the current crisis which emphasize the excessive
demands being made upon the system. Diagnoses of that kind characterize
the crisis in terms of the variety of new political pressures and social
concerns which have made themselves felt and successfully command economic
resources and governmental attention: consumer protection, en-
vironmental ism, job health and safety, racial and ethnic minorities; the
physically handicapped, etc. The crisis is caused in these theories by
the fact that such new demands have outrun our productive capacity and
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overloaded our political institutions.^
The theory of regulation is not demand oriented in this sense. A
regulatory crisis is characterized by a failure of the productive system;
it is caused by the fact that the system has outgrown its precedent
institutional structure and can be resolved only by the development of new
institutional mechanisms. The excessive demands are a symptom of the
crisis, but they are not its cause and the crisis cannot be resolved by
reference to them. One would in these terms no more characterize the
present crisis in terms of excessive demands than one would the Great
Depression. The 1930's, like the 1970's, was a period in which a whole
variety of groups which had not previously been influenced on the American
political scene commanded concern and attention, and a wide variety of new
demands were seriously entertained. But once the new regulatory system
had been put in place in the postwar period, the groups which could not be
accommodated within it were ignored or surpressed and their demands came
to be viewed as absurd. It will not be possible in the present context to
develop a detailed theory of how and why this occurred: but the elements
of this process will be apparent in the discussion of the evolution of the
industrial relations system. What is at stake is the way in which the
system once in operation generates an ideology which distinquishes what is
possible, or even thinkable, in terms of social progress. That ideology
must be built upon a credible regulatory structure: when the regulatory
structure begins to falter, its credibility deteriorates; all sorts of new
demands then become plausible and society, lacking standards by which to
evaluate them, finds itself unable to reject them.
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Integrating Divergent Economic Theories: A Digression
In a certain sense, this approach to economic analysis integrates a
number of different strands of economic theory, conventional and Marxist.
And, before preceeding further, it may be useful to indicate what those
strands are and how the integration among them occurs: First, conven-
tional economic theories are viewed, in the context of this approach, as
theories of different systems of regulation. They essentially explain how
the economy behaves between major regulatory crises. Marxist economic
theory, on the other hand, is a theory of the crisis: it explains how the
economic system itself evolves in history and why it outgrows particular
regulatory structures. In this way, the theory integrates a synchronic
and diachronic approach to economic analysis. Second, different schools
of conventional economic analysis are viewed as theories of different
regulatory systems. In one sense, they can be treated simply as
theoretically coherent systems of regulation without any actual historical
reference but there is a tendency to link particular theories with
particular historical moments and to explain changes in the dominant (or
accepted) theory over time by changes in the underlying economic structure
which they are attempting to explain and control. Thus, neoclassical (or
competitive market) theory is seen as characterizing the regulatory system
of the 19th and early 20th century; and Keynesian economics is seen as
characterizing the regulatory system of the postwar period. The reasons
for the growing rejection of Keynesian economics at this time and the
return toward neoclassical, monetarist analysis would then be sought in
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the nature of the current crisis (presumably a breakdown in the
institutional structures which make the economy behave in the Keynesian
mode, leading toward a world in which price adjustments and monetary
policy became more important in governing macro-economic behavior than the
quantity adjustments and fiscal policies which are emphasized in the
Keynesian theory). Third, the resolution of the crisis is dependent upon
the creation of new institutional structures, and that part of the theory
thus draws upon the political dimensions of Marxist theory and the
institutional analyses of the more conventional schools of thought.
Because the resolution of the crisis is political and institutional, it is
always contingent, and it is presumably in the midst of such crisis that
the system is vulnerable to revolution and reform. It is here, then, that
the theory of regulation promises to escape the historical determinism of
classical Marxism. Finally, one may view the institutional structures
which constitute the regulatory system as the superstructure of an economy
evolving in history. In this sense, the theory of regulation may be un-
derstood as an effort to give an independent life to the superstructure in
Marxist theory without totally divorcing it from the base which, in
classical Marxism, constrains the system and governs its evolution.
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II
The Capitalist Growth Process
We begin a detailed discussion of the current regulatory crisis by
characterizing the capitalist growth process. In so doing, we depart from
the original French literature, which has been primarily concerned with a
characterization of particular regulatory systems and with the identifica-
tion of the historical periods in which those systems prevailed. It is
not clear, therefore, how much of the following argument would be
generally acceptable to the original proponents of the theory. Nonethe-
less, the growth process does seem to be the logical point of departure:
It is that process which propels the economy through time and causes it to
outgrow any particular regulatory system. Hence, it is that process which
underlies the current crisis and which must be accommodated if the crisis
is to be successfully surmounted. As will become apparent, the nature of
capitalist growth also seems to explain the power and behavior of the
modern business corporation, which all agree is a key institutional com-
ponent of the contemporary system.
The central hypothesis is that productivity, and hence the level of
output for a given resource input, is a function of the division of
labor.
Smith used the transition from craft production to the pin factory to
illustrate the process of the division of labor. The modern analogue is
the emergence of the automobile assembly line. The assertion is that
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productivity is enhanced when a productive process is broken down into its
constituent tasks, or elements, and each task becomes the specialty of a
particular workman. Smith had several different hypotheses about why this
should be true, and much of the subsequent literature debates these, and
other alternative explanations. In the hands of Marx, the basic postulate
is severed from most of Smith's explanatory hypotheses: many of Smith's
own examples are shown by Marx, in fact, to have a negative effect upon
productivity when this is defined in narrow engineering terms and to be
profitable only because they enhance the employer's control over the labor
force.
The postulate, as reinterpreted by Marx, rests much more heavily upon
the intellectual dynamic associated with specialization. For these pur-
poses, the clearest example is not the extreme job fragmentation of the
assembly line (or pin factory) but the transition from a subsistence econ-
omy to a specialized industrial one. One can imagine economic development
as beginning in some distant historical age in which each household con-
sisted of a self-contained, polyvalent productive unit. Each unit pro-
duced a whole array of different products, ranging from a variety of agri-
cultural goods (wheat, barley, pigs, cows, and chickens, for example) to
shoes and clothing, the farm buildings, the house itself, and a variety of
tools and implements. Economic development is understood in this view as
the process of splitting this hodge-podge of different activities all done
in one unit into separate activities, each performed as a specialized
operation. An initial division, one might imagine, is made between agri-
cultural pursuits, manufacturing and construction. Subsequently, in agri
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culture, animal husbandry is separated from crop cultivation and then one
animal from another and one crop from another. In manufacturing, shoes
are separate from clothing; then, perhaps, spinning is from weaving and
sewing, or men's clothes from women's clothes.
The basic rationale for specialization of this kind is that each of
the activities is governed by a separate and distinct set of intellectual
principles: they require different forms of understanding. There is
little, therefore, to be gained by combining them into a single unit, for
the individuals who perform them must then master a variety of separate
and distinct bodies of knowledge. When the activities are separated out,
and made specialties in themselves, the people responsible for performing
the productive tasks are better able to master the principles which govern
their operation. They can learn more about what is already known and
probe deeper into the principles of nature to expand basic understanding.
And they are free to organize each activity according to it own logic
unconstrained by the other tasks which have to be performed. All of this
leads to more efficient operations, in the short run, for example, because
one can harvest the wheat at the moment when it is ripe without diverting
time to milk the cow or collect the eggs; but also in the long run because
it facilitates invention and discovery, the hybrid strains of wheat being
an excellent example.^
Motivated in this way, the postulate about the division of labor does
not imply the extreme fragmentation characteristic of the pin factory or
the assembly line. Indeed, one of the drawbacks of that form of
production is that operations become so separate that the workers loose
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any sense of the principles which give the productive intellectual
coherence: They simply memorize their jobs. And it is necessary to add
supervisory personnel whose basic task is to coordinate production,
spotting and correcting mistakes which the workers themselves would take
care of if the breadth of the job were sufficiently wide so that they
understood their work as part of a process. Much of the Marxian
literature argues, on this basis, that the assembly line is not efficient
in a narrow engineering sense and that extreme fragmentation is justified
only by the greater control which it gives the employer over his labor
force. The division and isolation of the labor force discourages union
organization; skill is minimized so workers are easily replaced; and the
speed of work is more easily controlled and, hence, can be intensified.
The notion of specialization as motivated by gains in intellectual
understanding implies that, to the extent that fragmentation does
contribute to engineering efficiency, it is because the fragmentated
tasks, once isolated, can be comprehended on their own terms, distinct
from the workers who perform them and the product which is the outcome of
the productive process, and each task understood instead as a distinct
operation which could be assimilated to the logic of a machine.
Fragmentation is, thus, a stage on the way to mechanization (or
automation) and it is economical because it facilitates invention : The
basic efficiency is, in other words, not static but dynamic. This seems
to have been Marx's own understanding of the process.
While this is a very different explanation of the underlying process
than that developed by Adam Smith, the basic postulate remains here, as in
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Adam Smith, that the process of economic growth is essentially a process
of specialization. And, as in Smith, it is limited by the extent of the
market. The market limits specialization because specialization generates
a problem of unemployment. When resources are non-specialized ( i.e.
polyvalent) and they become unemployed in one task, they simply shift to
another. When it rains on the farm, the farmer does inside work; if the
cow dies, there are still the chickens; if the wheat crop fails, one can
always eat barley. Specialized resources cannot do this. Construction
workers are unemployed in bad weather; knitters leave their jobs when the
fashion turns to sportswear, etc., and hence, unless the market is organ-
ized to absorb the increased output generated through specialization on a
continuous basis, the gains are simply dissipated by sustaining the
unemployed.
The extent of the market was, for Smith, essentially a geographic
concept. The idea is that unless the market covered a large enough ter-
ritory to absorb the output of a specialized pin maker, the pin maker
would be unemployed part of the time and instead of specializing in pins,
he would have to take on the other pursuits. This view of the process led
Smith to emphasize a reduction in geographic barriers to trade as the
critical development policy. But, as the preceding discussion should make
clear, the geographic extension of the market is only one way of facilita-
ting specialization: the market could also be deepened within a given
geographic area if demand within that area could be made to expand at the
same rate as potential productivity. This is difficult to see through the
pin example: it is after all hard to think of the market for pins expan-
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ding very far except territorially: any given consumer's demand for pins
will fairly quickly become saturated. The notion of internal expansion
becomes more plausible when one envisages specialization as occurring in "
the production of component parts, utilized in a wide range of final pro-
ducts, and, in this sense, potentially combinable into an infinite variety
of different goods (the kind of specialization involved in separating the
production of wheat and cows, for example). Here the productivity gains
associated with specialization have much more to do with the expansion of
an economy than with the expansion of any particular economic enterprise.
Specialization, interpreted in this way, however, will be influenced by
several other variables besides the extent of the market. Among these
are, the standardization of output and of component parts; the capacity to
inventory output, and the stability and certainty of demand. I have
developed these points elsewhere and will not belabor them here.
Standardization encourages specialization because it increases the number
of different items within a given territory and for a given level of
income which purchase a common set of inputs. The operative principle is
essentially the same theory as in geographic extension of the market.
Inventory enables the extension of the market in time. But inventorying
will be discouraged if the demand for output is unstable and uncertain.
Finally, instability discourages specialization because the specialized
resources become unemployed when demand turns down. This last point is
relatively important for arguments about economic dualism because it en-
courages forms of organization which separate the sustainable increases in
demand from those which are temporary, utilizing the specialized resources
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for the former and polyvalent resources, which move easily to other
activities, for the latter.
To summarize briefly, the view of economic growth and development
which underlies the argument presented here is one in which growth is
produced by the progressive specialization of productive resources. It is
thus a process dependent upon the progressive expansion of demand: unless
demand expands, it will be unable to absorb the increased output of the
specialized resources and the latter, because they are specialized and
unable to move to other pursuits, will be unemployed. In this sense, the
central growth problem in a capitalist economy becomes that of how to
organize demajid so that the required expansion is assured. There are a
number of distinct ways in which such expansion can be produced: through
the geographic expansion of demand; through the deepening of demand in-
ternally; through the reorganization of internal demand by standardization
of parts; by reducing uncertainty, stimulating inventorying, etc. Various
regulatory systems may be understood as instruments for ensuring the
expansion of demand on the macro-economic level. We shall see below that
in many ways the modern corporation arises in the attempt to do much the
same thing in particular markets and subsectors of the economy. It is in
terms of this view of the growth process that we attempt to understand the
postwar regulatory system.
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III
The Postwar Regulatory System
The postwar regulatory system has revolved around six basic institu-
tions: The central institutions are fourfold: 1) The large manufacturing
corporations, 2) The major industrial unions who bargained with these
corporations to establish the key settlements, 3) A broader industrial
relations framework in which the key wage settlements are embedded and
which spreads those settlements throughout the economy through systems of
wage administration, pattern bargaining, and legislation, and 4) A
monetary system which validates the wage levels established in this way
and, arguably, a fiscal structure which corrects minor deviations from the
full employment growth path which the large corporations and the unions
established. The system defined by this complex of institutions involves
relatively rigid prices and wage relationships: variations in relative
prices or in the relative wages of different groups of workers could not
be counted on, therefore, to overcome bottlenecks as they could be in a
competitive system, and hence, to operate smoothly the system requires
abundant supplies available at or below existing price levels. The fifth
and sixth features of the regulatory system have ensured that these are
not only present but can be called upon without disrupting the aggregate
balance; 5) Large reserves of poor labor in the rural areas available on
call to the industrial ranks. The low income levels of these workers and
their ties to poor families at home has assured that virtually all their
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earnings is recycled in domestic spending, 6) Extensive raw materials
available at home or in third world countries closely tied economically
and politically to the metropolitan market. As with domestic labor re-
serves, the poverty of the raw material suppliers abroad ensured that
their earnings would be spent and the colonial (or neocolonial) ties guar-
antees that the spending would occur in the purchasing country. In this
section, we will review the central features of this regulatory regime
under three headings. The modern corporation, the postwar industrial
relations system, and the adjustments in the system in the last 15 years.
A. The Modern Corporation
The characterization of the modern corporation upon which this theory
builds IS most extensively developed by Robin Mams and popularized by
John Kenneth Galbraith.^ Their argument is that such institutions differ
from the competitive firm hypothesized in neoclassical theory in that,
instead of taking market demand as given, they operate to control their
market, organizing demand and calling it into being through advertising
and other forms of aggressive marketing. Unlike the conventional business
firms, they tend to be interested in growth and in maintaining their mar-
ket share, independent of the effect upon profits, indeed, occasionally at
the apparent expense of higher profits.
While the literature on such institutions and particularly on how
precisely they behave, is not extensive, it is fairly clear that:
1) They arose as a dominant feature of the American economy in the late
19th century and 20th century.
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2) They tend to be run by professional managers rather than by owners,
and i
3) They are large, relatively structured bureaucratic institutions, in
which decisions are made by what Simon, Cyert and March view
as "rules of thumb" (such as, for example, the maintenance of market
share or historical growth rates) which have no clear relation to
profit maximization.^
This characterization is broadly consistent with the firm as under-
stood in the Marxist literature on monopoly capitalism. That literature
has not, however, been very concerned with the precise characterization
either of modern corporate economic behavior or of its historical origins.
The major theoretical function of the corporation seems, in that litera-
ture, to be to explain the coherence of the political strategies of the
ruling class. Such corporations, as opposed to the multitude of other
producing units, are assumed to have a common set of interests in the
class struggle, to be reasonable and rational enough to recognize these
interests, and powerful enough to impose them upon the rest of the ruling
class. The Marris-Galbraith firms could operate in this way, but, as we
shall see, the explanation developed below does not require that they do
so.*
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*The Marris-Galbraith characterization might have been less readily
accepted by Marxist theorists interested in the economic role of the
corporation: growth as an independent goal is different from the pur-
suit of profit which Marx assumes in his own theory and the degree of
control over their own market which Marris and Galbraith assert may not
be easily reconciled with the independent historical trajectory of the
system as hypothesized in Capital.
Neoclassical theorists have tended to reject the Marris-Galbraith
characterization out of hand. The "rules of thumb," they have argued, are
simply surrogates for more elaborate profit calculations that assume sta-
bility in certain decision-making parameters and will be abandoned in
favor of the theoretically valid formula when those parameters change.
They point to the large fringe of smaller firms which exist in even the
most highly concentrated industries and argue that these firms pose a
competitive threat to the large organizations which force them to behave
as theory assumes in order to survive.
Both the Marris-Galbraith firm and the fringe, to which this
neoclassical view points, can be understood in terms of the basic Smith
hypothesis about the relationship between specialization and the extent of
the market. The modern corporation becomes, in that hypothesis, an insti-
tution whose basic function is to "make the market." It might do this by
extending the market geographically, as for example, the British East
India Company did. It could do so by political pressure of one kind or
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another on major customers, e.g., military firms pressuring for military
spending; railroad and steel makers creating the demand for steel rail in
the 19th century U.S. But a good deal of what modern corporations in
industrial society appears to do is "extend the market" by stabilizing the
demand for output, i.e
.
by grouping together segments of demand which are
separately subject to wide fluctuations into a stable, predictable unit;
they are able to keep specialized productive resources fully employed and,
hence, to internalize the economies of scale inherent in the progressive
specialization of economic activity. The notion is relatively simple and
can be seen by glancing at figure I. The corporation imposes a division
of the market equivalent to line AB in this figure.
Outpu : Figure I
Stable Demands
B
i V
The behavior of modern corporations of this type is the behavior of
the Marris-Galbraith firm. The appearance of planning and controlling the
market is real: but the activity is not basically one of creating demand
in the first place, (or artificially stimulating it through advertising,
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to take issue with Galbraith's example), but of organizing and structuring
demand which is already there so that it forms stable segments. Institu-
tions which do this are interested in growth, as an independent goal—even
apparently at the expense of profit—because growth implies an extension
of the market, and they are preoccupied with market share, not as an end
in itself, but as a surrogate for that portion of demand which is stable
and predictable. The strategy is indicated by the quote from Arthur
Moxham of Dupont
.
"If we could by any measure buy out all competition and have
an absolute monopoly in the field, it would not pay us. The
essence of manufacturing is steady and full product. The demand
for the country for powder is variable. If we owned all, there-
fore, when slack times came, we would have to curtail production
to the extent of diminished demands. If, on the other hand, we
controlled only 60% of it all and make that 60% cheaper than
others, when slack times came, we could still keep our capital
employed to the full and our product to this maximum by taking
from the other 40% what was needed for this purpose. In other
words, you could count upon always running full if you make
cheaply and control only 60%, whereas, if you own it all, when
slack times came, you could only run a curtailed product."
[Quoted from a letter of Arthur Moxham to Coleman du Pont, June 1903
by Alfred D Chandler, Jr. in The Visible Hand
,
Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Ma., 1977, page 442. ]
The Problem of the stabilization of demand so as to achieve the
economies of scale inherent in specialization is a basic property of
capitalist systems of production but the modern corporation is probably
not the only solution to that problem. Conventional neoclassical theory
envisages a solution through price adjustments: presumably the idea is
that if prices were extremely flexible and fluctuated much more rapidly
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than output their variation would act to stabilize demand. When demand
declined, price would fall very quickly to the point where new consumers
were attracted into the market to replace those that had left and visa
versa. One might argue, therefore, that the modern corporation is a
particular solution to a general problem, explicable by some set of
peculiar historical conditions which have very little to do with
argue that the corporation was really invented at a time when demand was
dependent upon military or colonialist ventures, which could never have
been stabilized through a price system; that it was designed primarily to
stabilize government policies affecting these activities; and that the
strategy of stabilization was then extended as market capitalism emerged
in the modern era and stabilization through price fluctuations became
technically feasible.
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to think that what is being
stabilized is essentially aggregate demand, or something which is crudely
speaking analogous to it at the level of an industry. What is at stake
here are the economies of specialization: these are threatened by a
fluctuation which requires adjustments in the method of production. And
price variations will not dampen all fluctuations as they do fluctuations
in demand. Fluctuations in the availability of raw materials—attribu-
table for example to changes in climate conditions—are just as threaten-
ing to a system whose productivity is built into specialized machinery and
skills which are not readily shifted from one type of input to another. A
system which monopolizes raw materials divides production into specialized
and unspecialized segments and insures that the specialized segment
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receive the base line supplies in periods of shortage will be just as
effective here as it is in coping with fluctuating aggregate demand. The
requirements of a price system which produces this result are much more
stringent than are the requirements of a price system which would
substitute for a monopoly in capturing the economies of specialization in
the face of fluctuating demand. The essential point, however,
is not that the monopoly is either inevitable or better, but simply that
it is the institution which has played this role historically.
Because it is an institution designed to stabilize output and capture
the economies of specialization, the modern corporation reacts to fluctu-
ations in a manner very different from that predicted by conventional
theory. Conventional theory sees only two possible reactions to fluctua-
ting demand: either quantity can be varied or price can be changed. But
the modern corporation exists to pursue a third alternative: to organize
the market so as to stabilize production and price. This does not mean
that neither prices nor production change under the pressure of demand
shortages. But it does mean that this is not the natural, inevitable, and
immediate response of the corporation to such pressures. And it is, in
this sense, that under an economic regime characterized by such corpora-
tions, both prices and quantities are relatively rigid.
Economic downturns in which demand falls below the base line output
thus place large corporations under tremendous pressure: the pressure is
experienced as a kind of profit squeeze. Since the natural reaction is
not to cut prices or reduce output, the profit squeeze leads the corpora-
tion to cut costs, reducing the price which it pays for raw material and
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for wages. When the corporate institution is limited to the investment
industries, this has very little affect upon the behavior of the aggregate
economy. But as the corporate sector becomes more and more directly
dependent upon mass consumption, success in cutting wages tends to
undermine the very markets which must be sustained in order to maintain
base line production. This in the theory of regulation is the root cause
of the Great Depression.
Thus, to summarize, economic growth in capitalist economies is depen-
dent upon specialization. Specialization is, in turn, dependent upon the
extent of the market, and, in this sense, an effective system of regula-
tion must ensure the progressive extension of the market. In the late
19th century, the large modern corporation came into existence. This
institution extended the market by "organizing" demand into the largest
possible stable segment. The effect of operating in this way was that, in
the face of fluctuating demand, prices and output were relatively rigid.
When demand fell below the stable base line and the corporation exper-
ienced a profit squeeze, it reacted by attempting to cut input costs,
especially wages. The asymmetry between a product market where
corporations imposed rigid prices and a labor market without any
comparable institutionalized wage rigidity institutions created an
underconsumption bias. The effect of this upon aggregate economic
behavior was initially trivial since the corporate sector was small and a
good part of it was dependent upon investment demand. As the corporate
sector grew, however, and became increasingly dependent directly and
indirectly on production for the mass consumer market, the
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underconsumption bias began to undermine macro-economic performance: the
attempt to cut wages further undermined the very demand upon whose revival
it was dependent. This progressive movement toward mass consumption
industries was thus ultimately the cause of the Great Depression of the
1930's.
The underconsumption bias in the American economy was eliminated by
the industrial relations system most of whose essential elements appeared
in the late 1930' s, but which was embedded in the economy only in the
immediate postwar period. Conceptually, two distinct facets of the system
are important:
(a) a collective bargaining structure in the mass production industries
themselves linking wage increases to a productivity plus inflation
formula and
(b) a structure of pattern bargaining, administrative regulations, and
legislation making these mass production settlements key and extend-
ing them to the rest of the economy.
These are the second and third of the major institutional features of the
postwar regulatory system. The industrial relations system, understood in
the broadest sense of the term, also protected the internal domestic re-
serves and ensured their transfer to the industrial sector as required:
although we view this as a subsidiary feature of the total system, it is
convenient to treat it in combination with the other two features which
are critical.
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B. The Industrial Relations System
The industrial relations system which developed in the United States
in the 1930's and 1940's has a very clear institutional structure. Sub-
stantive legislation imposes minimum standards for wages, hours and
working conditions and defines certain minimal pension and insurance
benefits (unemployment insurance and workmans compensation). Legislation
also guarantees the right of workers to form and join union organizations
and of these unions to engage in collective bargaining with employers over
terms and conditions of employment above the legislated minimum. These
legislative guarantees are, however, exclusively procedural. The
substantive terms and conditions of employment above the floor are left to
the parties to determine through collective bargaining or, in its absence,
to the discretion of the employer, constrained by the market and by the
threat of union organization. In contrast to the legislated conditions in
some other countries, there is a wide gap between the minimal standards
imposed by law and the prevailing conditions in most industries and
regions of the country. In a sense, this framework may be said to define
two sectors of the economy: one at or close to the minimum in which the
terms and conditions are determined by laws and another above the minimum
where conditions are set by collective bargaining and/or competition.
Traditionally, there has been a large, third sector exempted from both the
substantive and the procedural legislation composed of the agriculture and
certain menial jobs in hotels, restaurants, laundries, household domestic
servants, and non-profit institutions such as hospital orderlies. This
sector housed the domestic labor reserves.
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The precise origins of this framework are of considerable importance
in understanding both how it functions as part of the regulatory structure
and how regulatory systems come into being and evolve over time. The
basic framework, as we have just described it, is defined by and embodied
in a variety of different pieces of legislation and court decisions,
almost all of which date from the 1930' s. If one looks at the legal
framework alone, one is tempted to think of the system as a conscious,
deliberate creation, put in place as a rational whole. In fact, however,
the legislative framework is probably better understood as the remains of
a vast program of social experimentation undertaken in the Depression
years, much of which was either abandoned or declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court. The elements of the current system derive from
several, conceptually distinct programs of social reform; and the critical
events in determining what survived and in forming them into a single,
more or less coherent institutional structure occurred after the
legislation was actually past, in the late thirties, during the war and
the immediate postwar period.
Extra-legal developments are also important because the components of
the industrial relations system as defined in law described above do not
precisely correspond to the components which are of interest from a regu-
latory point of view. The sectors of the economy which are exempted from
the legislation did tend to contain the domestic labor reserves, and the
substantive legislation has more or less followed key collective bargain-
ing settlements and have been important in spreading those to the rest of
the economy. But within the collective bargaining sector itself, there
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are divisions which are not reflected in the legislative framework. Those
divisions, and the way in which they operate and influence each other, are
important from a regulatory point of view.
In terms of the actual system, four historical episodes are central.
First, as already mentioned, the development of the legislative base in
the early and mid-thirties and its subsequent ratification by the Supreme
Court. Second, the wave of sit-down strikes in the middle 1930's and the
union organization of the mass production industries to which those
strikes led. Third, the system of controls during World War II, operating
through tripartite board composed of labor, management, and
public representatives but sanctioned by governmental authority. And,
four, the immediate postwar period, which witnessed the purge of the radi-
cals within the labor movement, the institution of the 1948 UAW-GM accord
of the productivity plus formula, and the spread of union organizations
throughout the manufacturing sector. For the highly concentrated mass
production industries which are key to the regulatory system, it is the
last three of these period which are important: the law is decidely
secondary.
1 . The Collective Bargaining Structure in the Mass Production
Industries
The organization of these industries came suddenly in a wave of spon-
taneous rank-and-file militancy in the middle 1930's. The chief ex-
pression of this unrest was a series of factory occupations, beginning in
the Acron, Ohio rubber industry in 1935 and spreading rapidly in the
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course of the following year to automobiles. The period was experienced
by most who lived through it as one verging on anarchy. The major corpor-
ations, which had initially resisted the plant occupations as a usurpation
of private property and held out against the unions, ultimately retreated
in an effort to forestall open revolution, recognized various worker
organizations, and entered into contract negotiations. The key decisions
in this process were the recognition of the UAW by General Motors and of
the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee by U.S. Steel in the Spring of
1937.
The initial recognition of the unions, however, was only one step in
the establishment of the postwar bargaining relationship. Industrial
unionism has had a long history of ups and downs in the United States.
Historically, employers accepted worker organization during periods of
economic prosperity and/or worker militancy, when the cost of industrial
warfare was high and, then, turned to repudiate them at some later stage
when the balance of power sprung back in their favor. The Wagner Act,
passed prior to the sit down strike in 1935, arguably changed the labor
relations climate by giving unions governmental backing and making col-
lective bargaining an explicit goal of public policy but the initial in-
dustrial unions were formed outside the framework of this act and in a
period when its constitutionality was still in question. It thus appeared
at the time as if unions and the bargaining process in which they forced
the employer to engage might be merely a temporary victory in a continuing
series of labor wars.
On the labor side, moreover, the strategy of collective bargaining in
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the late 1930 's when industrial unions were first organized was also un-
clear. It is conventional in retrospect to make a sharp distinction be-
tween labor leaders who were prepared to accept the existing economic
system and viewed collective bargaining as an instrument for the economic
progress of the workers within it and those who saw worker organization as
a means of effecting changes in the system itself. This distinction was
much less apparent at the time. The Depression had called into question
the viability of capitalism generally and basic systemic changes were
widely debated within the labor movement and outside. The government had
itself experimented with such changes in the National Industrial Recovery
Act. The established labor unions, moreover, had very little experience
with industrial collective bargaining. The old American Federation of
Labor was organized along craft lines: It initially opposed the new in-
dustrial unions which grew out of the sitdown strikes, and wanted to dis-
tribute the newly organized workers among the traditional craft jurisdic-
tions. The new industrial unions at first survived only by splitting away
to form the Committee for Industrial Organization (later, the Congress of
Industrial Workers.) And, if the organizational form was new, the stance
which such organizations should take toward the industrial giants with
which they bargained, the procedures of collective bargaining, the range
of permissible weapons, the range of topics to be discussed and demands to
be made were all confused and unclear. Sjraibolic in this respect was the
sit-down strike itself: an apparently indispensible weapon in the initial
wave of industrial organization, its legitimacy was suspect from the very
beginning and ultimately came to be rejected even by those who first em-
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ployed it and whose position seemed dependent upon it.* In a very real
sense, the emergence of industrial unions in the 1930 's represented such a
radical break with the past that it could be seen as itself a rejection of
the old capitalist system and the fashioning of a new alternative. In
terms of what industrial unionism turned out to mean in the postwar
period, therefore, subsequent events were critical. Among the most cri-
tical was the experience of the war itself.
Industrial relations were monitored during the war through a system
of tripartite boards composed of union, management and public representa-
tives. Although the boards eventually obtained the power to impose the
substantive conditions of employment and, in particular, to control wages,
their initial purpose was to sustain war production through the mainten-
ance of industrial peace, and this remained their basic mission. To this
end, the boards sought to maintain an equitable system of compensation and
work practices without undermining the basic productivity of the enter-
prise. That notion of equity and due process within a productivity
oriented economic unit became the goal of the postwar bargaining system.
The wartime experience also taught a generation of business executives,
labor leaders, and "neutral" arbitrators and mediators to accept each
other and work together systematically in a framework of real, but limited
conflict. Many of the issues upon which postwar bargaining focused, such
as the development of a "rational" wage and salary structure, the creation
*It was declared illegal by the Supreme Court in 1939.
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of job definitions, etc., also derived from the wartime experience and the
priority during the war accorded wage determination as opposed to other
possible worker demands. Thus, while the new unions entered the war with-
out a clear model of what collective bargaining might mean, the war ex-
perience provided the elements of such a model, and the postwar debate
within the labor movement was in large measure about the institutionali-
zation of that type of relationship.
The issues which had been discussed by these boards and the substan-
tive resolutions of them which the boards had made concrete were a defi-
nition of what constituted legitimate collective bargaining by industrial
unions. The system had clearly worked during the war and its working had
been consistent with a broad range of union participation in, and review
of, personnel and productive decisions. It was thus possible after the
war time experience, in a way in which it had not been before, to define a
range of things which industrial unions could do without generating either
revolution or anarchy. Management did not welcome the union participation
in these new activities; and not every union was able to force management
to accept its role in every item on the list, or even very many items.
But it was clearly possible to say that one or another of these items was
within the realm of legitimate demands and of feasible concessions. It
was even possible, by reference to items already on the list, to discuss
new demands, i.e. "innovations in collective bargaining"; if job
descriptions were a feasible subject of collective bargaining, for
example, then perhaps controls over subcontracting were feasible as well.
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The control experience, moreover, produced a group of labor leaders,
managerial officials and third party neutrals who had learned through a
kind of on-the-job training the vast array of particular cases and prece-
dents which constituted the concrete definition of collective bargaining.
They were, futhermore, personally acquainted with each other and experi-
enced in working together in tense situations where the conflict was real
and intense but nonetheless understood to be limited. This group of
people constituted a social community in which the definition of collec-
tive bargaining that grew out of the war resided. As such, they were
capable of clarifying that definition, extending it, and passing it on to
others. The community through a process of informal, unconscious, and
basically unself-conscious collective judgement served to identify and
apply standards of legitimacy. In the immediate postwar period, it worked
in this way to separate the radicals from those labor leaders and managers
who simply employed the tone and vocabulary of the radicals or anti-union
campaigns of the thirties in the heat of collective bargaining. "He
bargains hard but is a reasonable guy"; "he pushes to get a damn good deal
if he can but he won't put you out of business"; "he'll push you to the
wall, but he ain't going to break the union." The war time experience
thus created a "system" of collective bargaining; it was possible after
the war, in a way in which it had not been before, to distinguish between
those who accepted the system and those who were trying to use worker
organizations as an instrument to change it or break it.*
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*Because this is a controversial area, it is perhaps worth emphasizing
what this argument presupposes. It rests upon the idea that America is a
consensus society where adherence to the consensus is enforced, in the
first instance, by social pressure. The problem with industrial unionism
in the 1930's was that it emerged outside the existing consensus and this
gave it a great revolutionary potential. The war time experience was thus
critical in creating a definition of collective bargaining and a national
group which could operate to define and adjudicate adherence to it. Only
in those terms was it again feasible to say who was a revolutionary, a
rebel and who was not. Whether or not adherence to this new norm was a
"sell out" as the radicals would have it, or not, is another question.
It is important to note, however, that this was a real change in the
system as it was previously defined and was not a sham. It had a
potential for expanding for it did not obviously define a static or self-
contained role for unions: it was possible to finagle the precedents from
the war time controls to extend the collective bargaining issues and that
was done in the postwar period. It is possible, however, that if one
analyzed the precedents there was behind them a set of principles
implicitly at work that did limit what could actually emerge. What the
argument above is ruling out is: 1) a backroom conspiracy theory and 2) an
explicit sell-out. I acknowledge a debt to Pierre Bordieu whose ideas
about practical reason are implicit throughout the above.
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The immediate postwar period saw a purge within the labor movement,
based upon these standards, of the radical elements who were unable or
unwilling to accept the emergent structure. This purge was directed
explicitly at the "communists" and discussions of it have come to merge
with discussions of McCarthyism and the allegations of communist infil-
tration in high government levels in the early 1950's. Again, therefore,
it is important to distinguish the "anti-communist" purge in the labor
movement from the wave of general anti-communist hysteria and to make
clear what is being argued here. We are arguing that within the labor
movement the issue was not simply communism but adherence to a type of
labor movement and collective bargaining which had been defined through
the World War II control experience. The term "communist" was used as a
shorthand for opposition to this standard because, in general, communism
had come to stand before the war for an approach to worker organization
which abjured limited goals of any kind. Also, many of those within the
labor movement who had been tempermentally and philosophically attracted
by communism and other radical philosophies before the war were also
opposed to the acceptance of the newly defined system of collective bar-
gaining after the war. The issue was not simply "communism" or the
"Soviet Union," and many people who were not communists and who were
opposed to the party, found themselves alienated from the newly defined
labor movement in this period. There were in other words a set of real,
and generally known standards—albeit a set of standards which, because
they were embodied in precedent and community rather than a set of
abstract principles, are difficult to define—which in this period people
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within the labor movement were quite consciously accepting or rejecting.
Second, this is not to say that communism was a wholely irrelevant or
manufactured issue. The "right-wing" of the labor movement was genuinely
anti-Communist: some because they shared a basic commitment to the exis-
ting economic system: many more because they had been deeply offended by
the twists-and-turns of the Party through the 1930 's and into the war in
response to changes in Soviet policy. The communists were thought to have
demonstrated that their loyalty was to the Soviet Union and not to the
labor movement. And the control issue in the purges of 1948 was the
choice between the Communist-backed Progressive candidate Henry Wallace
and President Truman, who had the support of most of organized labor.
The heritage of the 1930 's was also a factor. A great many of the
true radicals—true in the sense that they sought fundamental social
transformation through the labor movement—had been Communists in the
1930 's, and there was a strong association in everybody's mind between
radicalism and communism. The battles between the Communists and the non-
communists had been very, very bitter. Because of disputes within the
labor movement revolving around this issue, strikes had been won or lost,
people had suffered extreme economic hardships, many people had been
physically injured, and some had been maimed and killed. In isolated
communities, workers suffered an extreme kind of social ostracism which
was worse than either economic and physical injury. The bitterness of
those battles, the memories among labor leaders of the people who they had
led into battle, whom they had recruited into the movement and through
participation in the movement had destroyed carried over into the postwar
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period, and the purges became a vehicle for expanding guilt and for
revenge. Thus, people were purged from the labor movement because of the
stands they had taken in the thirties even though they might have been
willing to accept the new collective bargaining norms or were actually
indifferent to them. To the extent that the purges were really about
these new norms, these people were innocent victims. But we are expli-
citly rejecting the idea that the purges could be explained either by past
history or as a purely cultural phenomenon: they were a part of the pro-
cess through which a new system of regulation was put into place. Third,
however, it is extremely doubtful that the purges involved an explicit
agreement between organized labor and a group of business leaders. ^^ The
need and process of purging the labor movement of its most radical
elements was very widely discussed within the labor and business commu-
nity, and there were undoubtedly discussions between labor leaders and
business managers at the local and the national level. This was not a
purely spontaneous movement. On the other hand, the understandings
involved were far more general and complete than those that might emerge
from an industrial pact. The war time experience taught the business
community that they could live with a labor movement which adhered to
certain standards and practices: They believed moreover that it was their
legal obligation to do so. They did not believe that they could operate
with unions who pursued more radical, open ended goals and made clear that
they would alter and break unions which did so. Labor, on its side, knew
what the standards in terms of which radicalism was being judged were;
accepted them either tactically or by conviction; recognized that given
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the nature of industrial unionism, it was whole corporations and whole
national unions which defined industrial relations policy, not individual
plant managers and local unions, and it made its policy with respect to
"radical" and "communist" unions accordingly.
The UAW-GM Agreement
The final episode in the development of the key bargaining component
of the postwar regulatory system was the introduction of the productivity
plus inflation formula in the 1948 bargaining round between General Motors
and the United Automobile Workers. ^^ The precise origins of this formula
are somewhat obscure. The formula had been discussed by Reuther for
several years preceding the 1948 settlement, and he saw it as a means of
maintaining purchasing power or, in other words, as an element in
precisely the kind of regulatory system which we are discussing here. To
operate in this way, it was critical that the key settlement be extended
to the rest of the economy but, as we shall see shortly, that extension
had already been guaranteed by the institutions put in place by the labor
board. The company appears also to have understood the formula would
constitute a way of maintaining national purchasing power, although its
statements on this matter are less explicit and less complete. From the
company's perspective, a second aspect of this formula was probably more
important: it effectively resolved the issue of the distribution of
earnings between wages and profits on a national level; it represented an
implicit acceptance by the union of the distribution of earnings between
wages and profits would not itself be an issue at the bargaining table.
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In this sense, the formula was the final concession by the union to the
existing economic system. The union had already conceded the existing
production system in the rules governing technology and discipline: those
rules essentially gave the right to the company to select the technology
and to set disciplinary standards which would insure that the technology
was utilized effectively. The unions role in the shop was to insure that
those standards were administered equitably. After 1948, union demand
concentrated on non-wage, off-the-job security, e.g. retirement pensions,
health insurance, guaranteed income and supplementary unemployment insur-
ance. In this respect, it followed a kind of social democracy version of
worker gains within a capitalist system,
1. The Extension of Key Settlements
The second feature of postwar industrial relations critical to regu-
latory system was the extension of the settlements in the mass production
industries to the rest of the economy. Such an extension will be produced
by a system in which relative wages among industries and occupations are
rigid: the key settlements in the mass consumption industries will then
produce "distortions" in the initial wage structure and the forces main-
taining rigidity will come into play to restore the original wage rela-
tionships. Economic analysts have always recognized the presence of
strong rigidities in relative wage relationships operating in the labor
market, and the force of these customary relationships is generally taken
to be the major factor distinguishing labor from other commodities. Very
few economists have ever argued that relative wages vary freely as, in
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theory, at least, other prices are assumed to do. And it is often
admitted that in socially cohesive communities, characterized by
traditional craft and agricultural pursuits, customary relationships
dominate wage behavior.^'* But one can argue that in the 19th and early
20th century in the major areas of industrialization, social cohesion was
weak; and custom was so swamped by competitive pressures, that the market
mastered the wage structure. One of the things which makes this argument
plausible in the American context was the large, floating immigrant labor
force, divided within itself by ethnic and linguistic barriers and without
strong social ties to any particular industry, craft, or geographic
location. This, however, began to change with the advent of the First
World War, which cut off both the flow of new immigrants and the prospect
of return for those already here: by the 1930 's, the immigrant work force
was substantially stabilized and the industrial labor force had come to be
characterized by strong, cohesive, ethnic communities. I have argued
elsewhere that this transition was in large part responsible for the
timing of the industrial union movement. ^^ It would, in any case, have
been expected to reintroduce customary rigidities in the relative wage
structure and to weaken the play of market forces. The institutional
changes in the period may thus be seen as strengthening the force of
custom and permitting it to dominate market pressure.
Three distinct institutional features had this effect. First,
minimum wage legislation placed a floor under the wage structure: that
floor tended over time to rise as wages rose generally in the private
sector. Second, the wages of public employees and in public contracts
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with private firms were tied to wages in the private sector by legislation
and administrative practice. Finally, within the private sector, union
settlements tended to be intertwined, using the mass production industries
as a benchmark and a guide, and administrative practice and fear of union
competition tied non-union wages to the union patterns. °
Of these three features, the last is critical: it is also the most
complex, and in a certain sense most subtle because there is no single law
or institution which could be said to embody or impose it. During World
War II, the wage-labor boards came very close to playing this role: The
wage structure was in this period imposed by government: since all labor
was in short supply and there was an elaborate mechanism for direct allo-
cation, market pressures on relative wage relationships were forestalled
and the central goal became one of establishing an equitable wage struc-
ture capable of orderly administration. For purposes of equity, they
relied heavily upon custom and past practice, and, in so doing, made ex-
plicit those customary relationships already present. In identifying and
sanctioning customary relationships, they undoubtedly also strengthened
allegiance to them and created linkages, (or the awareness of linkages)
which would not otherwise have been present. A number of administrative
practices, dictated essentially by the need for objective ways of compar-
ing wages on different jobs and in different parts of the economy, were
also pioneered by the wage-labor boards and introduced to labor and man-
agement officials who participated on them. The legal compulsion of the
war-labor board was eliminated at the end of the war but as described
above, its effects lingered in the postwar period. The labor force and
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the labor and management representatives directly responsible for wage
setting left the war with a greatly heightened consciousness of and
attachment to the relative wage relationship which the board had sanc-
tioned. And the standards of efficient wage administration were carried
over into the postwar industrial relations practice: the administrative
procedures pioneered by the boards were widely adapted both in collective
bargaining and in unilateral managerial wage setting and the development
of such procedures as job evaluation and community wage surveys, begun by
the boards, was continued afterwards by non-governmental organizations.
The reimposition of controls briefly during the Korean War tended to rein-
force the informal authority which they had achieved in the interim with
renewed official recognition.
While the controls episodes were important in identifying (and to
some extent creating) the customary wage structure and in the development
of administrative practice, other forces operated to hold the established
wage structure in place. The major industrial settlements were probably
the most tightly bound together. Arthur Ross has termed the nature of the
bonds "orbits of coercive comparison."^" They were forged by the interde-
pendent organizational histories, and by the high visibility of the
settlements themselves. Much of leadership of the major industrial unions
in the postwar period come out of the organizing committees of the CIO;
they were often colonizers who were sent from one industry to organize an
adjacent one and, thus, had close personal and professional ties to the
industry from which they came. They also saw themselves in competition
with one another for national prominence and leadership positions within
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the labor movement. The rank-and-file, as well as other union leader,
used the settlement in one of the key industries as a standard by which to
judge the efficacy of the leadership in another. Since those industries
were closely linked economically, directly through input-output relation-
ships and sensitive to the same macro-economic events even when not bound
together indirect client-customer relations, this was a sensible procedure
of evaluation. But it created interdependencies which went beyond market
relationships and caused the settlements to follow one another even when
the product markets diverged or where the independence of the different
local labor markets would have permitted different rates of wage change.
Outside the key industries, there were other orbits of coercive com-
parison, for example in construction, the garment settlements, the
maritime industries. And wage settlements spread within these orbits. The
mechanisms which spread the key industry settlements to these outer orbits
and to the rest of the private economy were, however, more variated and
less mechanical than the notion of orbits of coercive comparison
suggests. Dunlop's term "wage contours" is thus probably more
appropriate.^^ Individual settlements thus diverged from the key pattern
to accommodate a variety of distinctive economic forces, political
pressures, and the like. But despite divergence, the key acted as a
magnet pulling the whole wage structure with it.
The forces responsible for the creation of the mechanisms were
similar to those within the mass production industries: an underlying
tendency for customary wage norms to rigidity relative wage relationships
in stable industrial commmunities; the explicit identification of these
-49-
norms, the sanctions accorded to them by the war-labor boards during World
War II, and the nature and role of union organizations in the postwar
period. But the strength of union organization outside the key industries
was very different and hence, the legal framework created by the National
Labor Relations Act does seem critical to the spread of the key
settlements. Because that threat has now altered, it is important to
remember that union membership continued to expand until 1955. The memory
of an offensive labor movement lingered well into the 1960's. Finally,
administrative instruments such as wage surveys operated to pick up and
spread union settlements even where there was no direct union
competition.
The other institutions which operated to spread the key settlement
—
minimum age legislation and wage setting practice in the public sector
—
require less comment because they are easily identified. The relationship
between the minimum and the average wage can be seen in Table . The
maintenance of this relationship was not automatic. Periodic legislation
action was regulated, but the action was insured by the importance of the
minimum wage in limiting non-union competition in certain politically
active unions, such as garments, and by political pressure from the labor
movement as a whole. In this sense, the minimum wage is an integral part
of the industrial relations system put in place in the 1930's and, in
fact, the strongest argument in its favor at the time it was passed was
the maintenance of our national purchasing power.
While the basic organization in the key industries occurred outside
that legislative framework and the decision of those industries to accept
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the legitimacy of collective bargaining probably had more to do with its
basic political and constitutional viability than visa versa, the same
cannot be said of the rest of the manufacturing sector. The spread of
unionism was largely a postwar phenomenon; it occurred within the
framework created by the NLRA, utilized the procedures created by the Act,
and depended very much on the legitimacy which the act conferred upon
collective bargaining and often upon the explicit legal protections which
the Act offered as well. There was, thus, a great disparity in basic
strength between the mass production industries and the rest of the
unionized sector. This gave the mass production industries a leadership
role and insured that the rest of the industry would follow them and not
visa versa. The size and coherence of these industries, and the impact of
even potential labor unrest upon the national economy, moreover, meant
that enormous publicity surrounded their settlements and in this way
served to make them a standard against which settlements by weaker unions
were judged even if the standard could not be reached. And union
settlements were reflected in the non-union sector as companies, under a
threat of union organization made credible by the legal protection which
the NLRA offered, tried to maintain the allegiance of their unorganized
member
.
The ties between the wage structure of the public and the private
sectors probably require less of an explanation. It seems natural in a
democracy with a strong distrust of government to resolve the question of
public salaries in this way. But certain elements of this system—such as
the Davis-Bacon Act which extends private sector union wages in the
-51-
construction industry to public contractors—are part of the larger
industrial relations structure, imposed and maintained by union political
clout. And the "naturalness" and inevitability of their arrangements was
suddenly throvm into doubt by the organization of public employees in the
1960's. In the meantime, however, the significance of these
administrative procedures in the overall economy grew with the growth of
governmental activity and its concommitant of public employment in the
postwar period.
C. Adjustments in the Postwar Regulatory System :
Beginning in the middle sixties and extending through the early
1970 's, the regulatory system which we have just described was subject to
a series of shocks. These shocks produced several economic disturbances
and dislocations, which we have come--we shall argue somewhat erroneously-
-to associate with the end of the prosperity of the postwar era. They
also led to a variety of reforms and adjustments in the postwar regulatory
structure. The most important of these shocks were, beginning in the
middle sixties: the Civil Rights Movement and the concommitant shift in
the attitude of black workers; the progressive organization throughout the
decade of public employees; and, in the early 1970's, the Arab oil embargo
and the Russian wheat deal.
1. Civil Rights
From an economic point-of-view, the major significance of the civil
rights movement was that it signaled the end of our domestic labor
reserves. Throughout the first two postwar decades, the Southern rural
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labor force had greased the wheels of a labor market in which relative
prices were rigid and, hence, incapable of operating to allocate labor.
The rural labor force was maintained apart from this structure by the
exemption of agriculture from the minimum wage. The low wages which
resulted encouraged the continuation of the traditional agricultural
technology. The technology required a mass of unskilled labor at harvest
which was left largely idle the rest of the year to live through
subsistence farming on marginal agricultural lands. The system was
capable of tolerating the goings and comings of a large proportion of its
potential labor force. Since the plantations did not care how many people
shared the subsistence plots so long as there were at least enough to
cover the harvest. Given the low wages and living standards, therefore,
this Southern rural labor force was on call to employers within the fixed
wage sector who recruited when labor in their own areas was in short
supply. The new recruits were employed under specialized
institutional arrangements where their wages were part of the fixed wage
structure but with different work rules and much more flexible employment
security arrangements than those prevailing elsewhere. When no longer
required, the newly recruited workers were encouraged to return to their
rural homes
.
Gradually in the course of the postwar period the bulk of the labor
available in this was, however, absorbed into permanent fixed wage
employment. The migration process, moreover, also operated over time to
change the attitudes of those who remained outside of, or only marginally
attached, to the prevailing wage system. Workers who had settled in the
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North and their children who were raised there became increasingly
intolerant of differential employment conditions on jobs to which even
second generation black urban dwellers were confined: Managers saw this
intolerance as insubordination and recalcitrance. In the South, the civil
rights movement imposed changes in the social structures, voting patterns,
and working relationships which led employers to adopt a new technology,
which eliminated the need for surplus labor and permitted them to expel
the black labor reserves once and for all, and close off the possibility
of return. Finally, in the overall political climate of the 1960's, the
minimum wage exemption which placed the agricultural labor force outside
the fixed wage structure was finally eliminated. Together these changes
rendered the whole labor market structure extremely rigid and potentially
threatened the viability of the regulatory system as a whole.
In the event, however, employers developed substitutes for the rural
labor reserves which operated, relatively quickly, to restore flexibility
to the labor market. The most important of these substitutes were
immigrants from rural agricultural areas abroad who accepted work in much
the same way and for much the same reasons as black workers from the rural
South had before them. A second source of elastic labor available on call
for prevailing wages were youth: the exhaustion of the rural labor
reserves coincided fortuitously with the arrival on the labor market of
the demographic bulge produced by the postwar baby boom, and the number of
students and adolescents seeking tuition and/or pin money in part time and
short time vacation work expanded rapidly. Several people have argued
that the public assistance system, which underwent an enormous expansion
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in response to the social pressures emanating from the civil rights
movement, also worked to enhance the elasticity of the settled urban labor
force. Welfare in this view worked like rural agriculture to provide a
cushion upon which people who could fall back when out of work. At the
same time, it substained a number of people (not so much the clients
themselves as ancillary members of the welfare household such as
boyfriends, older children, transient relatives) who were willing to work
at prevailing wages when work became available. To the extent that
welfare payments rose with prices and productivity, the public assistance
solution to the problem of wage rigidity was also consistent with the need
of the postwar regulatory structure to maintain internal demand.
2. Public Employees and Construction Workers
The second threat to the postwar regulatory structure came from the
organization of public employees in the course of the 1960 's. Prior to
that time, public employment was essentially outside the scope of union
organization and public employees were denied the right to strike. Wage
levels in the public sector tended to be linked by law and administrative
practice to private wage settlements. A typical procedure was for public
bodies to survey private wages for jobs comparable to their own on a
regular basis and to adjust their wages accordingly. To the extent that
the private sector was essentially governed by the productivity plus
inflation formula, this practice transferred that formula to the public
sector, insuring that it played its role in sustaining national purchasing
power. But, at the same time, the formula itself was derived from the
private sector and adjusted there to conform with the requirements for a
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stable expansion.
The organization of public employees, however, disrupted this
linkage. It made settlements in the public sector dependent upon the
bargaining power of public employees. To the extent that most employees
performed vital services, their power appeared unlimited. Because their
organization concided with an enormous expansion of the public sector, the
bargaining power, even when the services were not vital, was substantial.
The disassociation of the public and the private sector was, thus, itself
disruptive of the stability of the system. But it appeared for a time as
if the high visibility of the public sector would enable it to displace
the automobile industry as the key settlement for the private sector as
well, and that the whole wage system would become tied to the bargaining
power of public employees, a parameter which was essentially independent
of the regulatory requirements of the system.
In the event, however, these affects either never fully materialized
or were short lived. There was some realignment in pubic sector wages:
the demonstration effect caused by public settlements may have been
responsible for some of the wage inflation in the late 1960's and early
1970 's. But the bargaining power in the sector was not as great as
anticipated. Citizens learned to live with and wait out strikes of many
public workers whose services had previously seemed indispensible:
teachers strikes have become commonplace: major cities have survived
strikes by sanitation and hospital workers: even police and fire strikes
have come to be accepted. Ultimately, the tax payer's revolt has led to
an increasing resistance to public workers, and their settlements have by
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and large been forced back into a pattern of following the private sector
or lagging behind it.
In the late 1960's the construction industry threatened for a time to
similarly displace the automobile industry as the key settlement.
Competition among the leaders of a set of local unions highly fragmented
geographically and by craft vying for political dominance by outdoing each
other in forms of wage settlements in a period of very strong demand led
to astronomical construction wage settlements. In 1969, at a time when
the wages of autoworkers were rising at 5 and 6% construction settlements
reached 18 to 20%. Industrialists began to feel pressures eminating both
from unions and from the markets upon the wages of their own skilled
crafts. Ultimately, however, the displacement of the key settlement which
this implied was averted, first, through the creation of special wage
stabilization machinery for the industry by the Federal government and,
ultimately, by the growth of nonunion construction utilizing an
industrial technology which was not amenable to craft control and paying
wages tied to other settlement patterns.
3. The Food and Fuel Crises
The more serious and lasting disruptions appear to have been not in
the labor market and wage setting arrangements of the postwar regulatory
structure but in the product and price setting institutions, particularly
those which provided an elastic source of raw material supplies in the
face of rigidities which prevented prices of varying in a way which would
draw them forth. In basic food stuffs, this elasticity was created by the
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American agricultural price support system and the enormous commodity
surpluses which it generated. These surpluses provided stocks which
cushioned the impact of crop failures upon world commodity prices. The
price support system has always been looked upon with disfavor by the
American economic professor and in the course of the 1960 's, it was
revised so as to forestall further growth of commodity stocks. The result
was that when the Russians experienced a major crop failure in 1973 and
entered the world market on a large scale, their purchases were reflected
immediately in sky-rocketing food prices, which reverberated throughout
the price structure to produce a major inflation.
The Arab-Israli War of 1972, and the subsequent Arab oil embargo
produced a similar effect on world food prices. Again, one can attribute
this change to the exhaustion of what had previously seemed to be
unlimited oil reserves at the prevailing prices and/or the disruption of a
set of colonial and neo-colonial arrangements between industrial and
under-developed countries which insured the availability of these reserves
on world markets.
The food shortage has proved to be transitory, largely because crop
failures of comparable magnitude have not reoccurred. Certain
institutional reforms designed to control the access of communist
countries to U.S. markets have been introduced but it is doubtful that
they are sufficient to contain the Soviet Union (or any other large
country for that matter) determined to meet domestic demand through large
scale purchases. In this sense, the new vulnerability of the postwar
system revealed in 1973 remains.
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The effects of the energy crisis, however, have proved more long
lasting. Over the decade, the system has adjusted to that problem in
three ways. First, it has succeeded to some extent in severing fuel
prices from the rest of the price structure so that these can vary without
fully leveling all of the other prices in the system. Second, we appear
to be moving—but only very gradually—toward new sources of fuel that are
not in tight supply. Finally, we are learning to live with the inflation
which periodic fuel shortages seems to produce: Price stability may be
less of a threat to the smooth functioning of the postwar regulatory
structure than it seemed. The inflation has, however, undoubtedly
aggravated the current economic crises.
III. The Postwar Regulatory System and the Economic Crisis
We now turn, in the light of the preceding characterization of the
postwar regulatory system, to an examination of the current economic
problems and an evaluation of the solutions which have been proposed to
them. In order to do this, it is necessary to introduce several
conceptual distinctions. The basic distinction is between a regulatory
crisis and a crisis of a particular regulatory institution. Behind this
lies a second distinction between a mode of regulation and a particular
constellation of institutions in which that mode of regulation is
embodied.
-59-
A. Regulatory Crises and Institutional Crises
As we have developed the concept of a regulatory system it actually
carries two separable meanings. First, it is a constellation of specific
institutions. Those institutions, operating as a group, have certain
properties in allocating resources within and among specific markets
(micro-economic regulation) and in maintaining growth, price levels, and
employment (macro-economic regulation). These properties can be described
in abstract theoretical terms, distinct from the particular institutions
through which they are effectuated in a given country at a given time.
That theoretical abstraction constitutes a second meaning of the term
regulatory system. We shall refer to it as a mode of regulation.
This distinction is important. Virtually all industrial countries in
the postwar period have used the same mode of regulation: they all
maintain employment, growth, and price levels by insuring that national
purchasing power expands at a rate equivalent to productivity plus
inflation. They all involve systems of rigid relative wages and prices,
excess labor and raw material reserves, and direct allocation by large
corporate enterprises. But the institutional structure in which this
regulatory regime is housed varies substantially from one country to
another. In France, for instance, the State is the key institution both
in setting the basic wage formula and in extending it and thus substitutes
for the role play by the GM-UAW settlement and informal wage contours and
orbits of coersive comparison in the United States. These variations
among countries reflect differences in their social structures and
peculiarities of their national histories. For a normative evaluation of
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the systems, the differences among institutional structures across
countries within the same regulatory mode may be much more important than
the variations produced by the historical changes in the mode of
regulation itself.
In the same sense that the constellations of institutions varies
across countries, particular institutions within any given country also
change without changing the theoretical properties of the system as a
whole. These institutional changes are presumably a reflection of changes
in the underlying social and political structures in which they are
embedded. Sometimes the social and political changes are a reflection of
the same technological evolution as that underlying a fundamental reg-
ulatory crises. But it is important nonetheless to maintain a sharp
distinction between the social changes related to the evolving technology
and the changes in the requisite mode of regulation. The distinction is
important first because the two processes do not coincide, either in their
timing or in their effects and second because social and political changes
are produced not only by the shifting technology but by a number of other
factors as well.
In what follows, we shall reserve the term regulatory crisis for a
situation in which a system with given theoretical properties (a given
mode of regulation) can no longer maintain macro-economic stability. The
resolution of such a crisis requires the invention of a whole new complex
of institutions: and results in a new system with theoretical properties
which are distinct from the old.
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2. Social Crisis
If a confusion between a regulatory crises and an institutional
crises is one of the factors which has complicated the diagnosis of our
current economic problems, a second complicating factor has been the
confusion between these economic difficulties and the social difficulties
which accompanied them. The period of the late 1960 's and early 1970 's
was one of social crisis in most western industrial countries. In the
United States the major elements of that social crisis were the Civil
Rights movement and the student protest in the universities centering
around the Viet Nam War but often aimed more broadly at the materialistic
social structure of industrial societies abroad. Elsewhere student
protests directed at the social structure were often accompanied by
organization and protest among diverse elements of the industrial working
class. An important thrust of the analysis here is that the regulatory
crisis which we are currently experiencing is separable and distinct from
the social crisis which preceded it. The two crises have, however, become
confused in our thinking. This is so in at least three ways.
First, some of the crises of particular regulatory institutions were
directly linked to these social movements. This is clearly true, for
example, of the depletion of the black labor force as a domestic labor
reserve. Others of the institutional crises may be indirectly linked to
these social crises. For example, one might argue that the organization
of public employees was a response to the demonstration effect of the
black civil rights protests and facilitated by an expansion of the public
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sector which was a response to that same black pressure. One might be
able to tie all of the institutional problems of the late 1960's and
1970 's to social problems in this way, although the argument would
probably be rather forced. To the extent that one begins to think in
this way, however, the social crisis and the institutional crises become
confused.
A second source of confusion is that the social crises can be traced
to the evolution of the technology and/or to the regulatory structure
which grow up in response to that evolution. Thus, for example, it can be
argued that the foundation of the civil rights movement was laid in the
second world war when we began to draw upon the Southern black labor
force as a labor reserve for industrial society. Had we not needed such a
labor reserve to make the system function or had we found an alternative
and left the black labor force alone in the South, we never would have
faced the Civil Rights protests at all. Thus, the longrun social
consequences of particular regulatory institutions, and their feedback
effects upon the viability of those institutions both become confused
with the technological evolution which seemed to require the regulatory
structure itself. It is on this point that the analytical thrust of this
paper differs from much of the Marxist writing in the current period,
including some of the work conceived in the framework of the theory of
regulation. The third source of confusion is that the solutions
which we sought to the social crisis of the late 1960 's were predicated
upon a vision of the particular regulatory structure then in place. Now
that it has become clear that the prevailing regulatory structure is no
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longer satisfactory, the solutions are perceived as misconstrued; and we
tend to confuse the problems presented by these new institutions created
in an attempt to solve the social crises both with the broader problems
generated by the regulatory structure in terms of which the solutions were
conceived and with the attempt to address those social problems at all.
Thus, for example, an expansion of the public assistance system in the
attempt to respond to civil rights pressures was broadly consistent with
the postwar regulatory system both in the sense that it helped to sustain
aggregate purchasing power and it enhanced the flexibility of the labor
force in the face of a rigid wage structure. It is now, however, being
blamed for our economic problems.
This distinction between the current economic crisis and the
preceeding social one is a basic point of divergence between my argument
and other Marxist interpretations conceived in a similar framework.
Marxist analysis generally makes a sharp distinction between the base of
the economy, rooted tightly in technology, and the institutional and
ideological superstructure. Classical Marxism sees the superstructure as
a reflection of the base. Crises are generally produced in this view by
the evolution of the base, the failure of the superstructure to keep pace
with it and the consequent need to resolve the conflict between them. In
more recent Marxist theory, there is a tendency to give the superstructure
an independent life of its own, permitting it to evolve according to its
own laws of motion. This creates the possibility of a second type of
crisis, one that could occur even if the base stood still.
Most Marxist theories of the current crisis tend to be of this second
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kind. Generally, they view the crisis as consisting of excess demands
generated by carrying to its extreme the logic of certain ideological
principles which arose originally to facilitate the operation of the
system. Bowles and Gintis, for example, emphasize the conflict between
notions of democracy, which originate in the attempt of the bourgeoisie to
free itself politically from the feudal classes but which, when applied in
the economic sphere, conflicts with totalitarian control of the work place
under a Fordist regime. Weiskoff emphasizes institutions like social
security which arise to sustain purchasing power and eliminate the under
consumption bias of the economy but which have a logic of expansion which
eats into profits to the point where investment is eventually choked off.
A similar notion of contradictions built into existing institutions
underlies arguments about immigrants and peasant workers who are recruited
into industry because their farm background leads them to accept working
conditions which their children, raised in urban areas, rebel against and
seek to change. Many of these notions are plausible explanations of the
social crisis. I myself am particularly attached to the last. But in the
distinction between a social and a regulatory crisis, we are essentially
rejecting them as an explanation of present economic difficulties and
turning instead to a much more classic Marxist interpretation. This is
not to deny the importance of the social crisis. It very nearly brought
down the system. But
—
perhaps unfortunately— it failed to do so; and it
now shows very little promise in this regard for the future.
The Reagan economic prescription also seems to embody this
confusion between the current regulatory crisis and the preceding one.u
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The basic prescription for the economic ills growing out of the regulatory
crises is a repeal of social programs developed in the 1960 's (and
apparently in 1930's as well). If, as we are arguing, we face a genuine
regulatory crises, however, this approach will not succeed. The
underlying regulatory crisis can only be resolved by reference to a new
mode of regulation. An institutional implantation of that new mode is the
only program which will resolve the crises. As part of such a program,
social legislation might be revised and reshaped to fit the new regulatory
mode. But the repeal of existing legislation alone is likely only to
revive the social problems to which it was originally addressed. The
essential problem, therefore, is to envisage an appropriate mode of
regulation. It is to that problem that we turn in the next section.
IV: Resolving the Current Crises
A full discussion of the alternatives for resolving the current
crisis will require a separate paper. Here we can do no more than mention
the major issues. We do this under three headings: The New International
Order, Nicheism, and Competition.
A. The New International Division of labor
The most obvious solution to the current crisis is a reproduction on
an international scale of the mode of regulation which governed the
domestic economies of the major industrial nations in the period of
postwar prosperity. The solution is most obvious because we already have
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in the postwar regulatory system a conception about the basic properties
of such a system and how it might be organized. Indeed, given the
variation in the postwar institution arrangements across individual
nations, we have several different models of actual institutional
arrangements. And, in fact, probably because it is so easy to
conceptualize, most of the writings about economic reform in recent years
draw upon such a model, explicitly or implicitly. That model is generally
termed, "the new international division of labor."
The idea is direct and simple: if the domestic markets of the
existing industrial nations have expanded to their geographic limits and
internal demand for mass consumption goods has become saturated, why not
open a new economic frontier, as it were, by incorporating into the system
the untapped potential for mass consumption of the underdeveloped world.
The developed markets, it is to be emphasized, cannot simply be abandoned:
it is the total size of the market which is critical in determining the
productivity of the mass production industry. Hence, this is not a
project which an underdeveloped world could realize on its own, in
isolation from the industrialized nations. But, because they will supply
the increments to demand which enable continued technological progress and
productivity gains, the developing countries—or at least some of the
developing countries—are pivotal to the realization of the new system.
Actually they are pivotal in two ways:
First, their consumer markets are unsaturated and, hence, have the
potential for the kind of expansion over a long period necessary to
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realize the economies of scale apparently still available in mass
production industries. Second, their labor force has shown a willingness
to accept the kinds of employment associated with the mass production of
standardized goods; the income which they will gain through acceptance of
these employments will presumably serve to create these expanding markets.
The literature on the new international division of labor has sometimes
emphasized the reluctance of the labor force in the industrial world to
accept those jobs, and this may be an additional factor in the
redistribution of production but this is not critical to the explanatory
model which we are using here. The literature on this subject generally
suggests that the older industrial countries would then produce specialty
items or technological innovations, or something where the more highly
educated labor force has a special comparative advantage.
Because such a model is implicit in a good deal of popular
discussions, the difficulties here are relatively well known.
Essentially, they amount to the fact that it is not clear that either the
developing or the developed countries are really interested in such
schemes. Nor is it clear how, if there were an interest—either among the
relevant countries or, more realistically, among significant economic and
political forces within them—such a regulatory scheme could be realized
in practical political forms. The developing countries, for their part,
actually seem more interested in the consumption of a relatively limited
upper and middle class than in expanding the income of the industrial
working class en masse. They have been more concerned about basic
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industries and military potential than about mass consumption industries
producing automobiles and washing machines and they have been preoccupied
by an economic independence to which the integration into large
multinational corporations directed abroad poses a considerable threat.
None of the major industrial nations, on the other hand, have shown a
great interest in such schemes either. There has been a general
reluctance to see industrial production move abroad. Nor is it clear how
or why, if mass production does move abroad, the specialty and prototype
production should remain in older industrial areas. Some of the
developing countries have shown a considerable capacity for this kind of
work. Brazil, for example, whose demand has probably the greatest
potential of any single country as a new motor for Fordistic development
has been one of the new leaders in certain kinds of prototype development.
But, as we have just seen, the markets of the older countries are an
essential base for the whole system, and it is not clear how these markets
can be maintained if all industries move abroad. Finally, it is difficult
to see how a system of this kind would come into being. A dominant
international power could presumably impose it. But there is no such
power capable of doing so at the moment. The Reagan administration is
pursuing a policy designed to restore the dominant position of the United
States, but the use of this power to restore such a conception of
international order is not part of its vision. Moreover, the resurgence
of American power to a point where it could dominate the world economic
order in the way it did after the war seems extremely problematic. Absent
a single dominant nation on the world scene, the structure would have to
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be imposed either by the multinational corporations, who presumably have
their own intrests, or by multi-lateral negotiations among soverign
states
.
The issue, however, is not so much the difficulties. Most of the in-
stitutional arrangements which lie at the heart of the passing (dying)
economic order must have seemed equally remote in the period before they
emerged. This is certainly true of most of the important nation states.
The difficulty is that there are no signs that order—or rather an order
—
of the kind we are envisaging here is in any sense emergent. While an
eventual resolution of the crisis through the construction of an "inter-
national" Keynesian (or "Fordist") system cannot exactly be ruled out,
this mode of regulation is clearly not going to be realized in the near
future. In the meantime, a very different technological structure appears
to be developing.
B. Nitchism
The hallmark of this alternative structure is its flexibility; its
capacity to shift quickly from one product to another; the way in which
it avoids a commitment to long runs of standardized products. In contrast
to the mass production techniques of the preceding era, this technology
appears to be associated with much smaller productive units, much more
versatile equipment, and a labor force which is generally more highly
skilled and better educated than the workers in older manufacturing
facilities. The country which seems to have gone furthest in terms of
development along these lines is Italy. But even the U.S. there are
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signs that it is emerging in older industrial areas of New England, and
the mid-Atlantic.
How should one interpret these new technological and organizational
forms. In their origins, they are probably explicable in terms of the
crisis itself. The characteristic of an economic crisis—all crisis, not
this one in one in particular— is profound uncertainty; the loss of
control over, and consequent fragmentation of, markets. Indeed, in Italy,
the decentralization of industry actually began as a response to the
confusion generated by the social (and in our terms institutional) crisis
of the late 1960 's which preceded the international world economic
crises.
This shift toward a more flexible set of markets appears, in recent
years, to have been greatly expedited by new developments in technology
itself. Beyond a doubt, the most important of these developments has been
in the application of computers.... But as there are others; the steel
industry technology.... What is not clear is whether there is something
inherent in the new technology which lends itself to this kind of
flexibility or whether the particular climate in which it has developed
—
namely the climate of uncertainty generated by the world economic crises
—
has led a development of this particular aspect of the technology's
potential. To answer that question, we need a much fuller theory of
technology than that which we have developed in the context of this
paper.
Supposing for the moment that, either because of something inherent
in the new technology itself or because of the particular historical
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moment in which it was introduced and its development pursued, we have
reached a new era in which economic growth is no longer linked to the
creation and expansion of mass markets: we are then presented with a
second question: What might a regulatory structure based upon this new
alternative look like? And in particular, can one envisage a structure of
this kind coordinated by the market as neoclassical economists seem to
envisage it? Again, this is a question which we will attempt to deal with
in a subsequent paper. To briefly anticipate the answer; it seems
unlikely. The reasons it is unlikely are twofold: First, on empirical
grounds, the market does not appear to be playing this role in these parts
of the economy where one can see this new fragmented market structure
emerging. (Prices are possibly more flexible in these markets, but they
do not serve to coordinate the allocation of resources). The second
reason is theoretical: The competition in these sectors centers around
the adaptability of the product to a specific use. Thus there is a
tendency to attempt to overcome a cost disadvantage, not by reducing
price, but by increasing the "efficiency" of the product in the use for
which it is intended (i.e. by enhancing its quality) or by moving to a new
market. Thus, in a sense, it is like mass production with respect to
price: The mass production firm attempts to overcome competitive
pressures by expanding (or stabilizing) the market; the specialty firm
attempts to do this by finding a new position within existing markets. In
both endeavors, it seems firms operate with mark-up pricing rules and
depend as much as possible upon stability in the economic environment
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outside the particular dimension (quantity for the mass producer, quality
for the specialty producer) along which they are operating.
The above, however, really speaks to the question of micro-economic
regulation. What about the macro-economic system. This is a much more
complicated question. One can imagine a return to a kind of national
Keynesianism under the new system. One might need to close the economy
domestically in order to produce this. But it could also happen simply
because national producers are in a better position to forcast their own
markets than are foreign producers. The difficulty with envisaging such a
system is that experience with small scale technology is limited to
produce goods or high fashion luxury goods. This type of production has
yet to enter into direct competition for mass consumer markets.
Meanwhile, what seems to be happening is that the new flexible
production techniques are simply being drawn into the vortex of the world
system. It is a system in which individual countries seem to be able to
survive more or less well, but only at the expense of each other. How, in
this light, might one evaluate the economic policy of the Reagan
administrat ion?
C. The Reagan-Carter Competitive Solution
The announced thrust of the Reagan administration economic policy is
the withdrawal of government and the restoration of the competitive market
place as the governor of economic activity. This policy would in our
terms make sense if one could envisage a resolution of the crisis in terms
of a regulatory system built around a regime of flexible prices as
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it is construed in neoclassical theory. This, as we have just seen, is
extremely difficult to do. In terms of the types of regulation which it
does seem possible to envisage, the policy basically amounts to a
dismantling of a set of institutions, inherited from the old regulatory
structure, in a way which will enable the mass production industries upon
which that structure was built, to survive by competing more effectively
in the world economy. Interpreted hi this way, the essential thrust of
the policy is not the restoration of competition, but the radification of
the industrial relocation from the older urban areas of the North and
Midwest, where the labor movement was strong and the political support for
social legislation was based, to the South and Southwest, where labor is
weak and social legislation relatively unpopular. Managers seem to
believe that, in this atmosphere, they will be better able to adapt the
technology which will enable them to compete with the Japanese and
Europeans on world markets. This policy is being pursued in a way which
implies the abandonment of the older industrial areas. The two aspects of
the policy, it should be noted, are not inherently related. Alternative
employments might be sought to replace the industries which are moving
South: but, to do so it is necessary to sustain the infrastructure,
something the older communities, given their declining tax base, are
having great difficulty doing on their own.
American reindustrialization through a resurgence of our mass
production industries on world marketing is not, as was made clear in the
introduction, a solution to the world economic crisis. If successful, it
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will at best transfer our own economic problems to our principle
international competitors. Because these countries are also our principle
political allies, we are not in a position to ignore the distress which
would ensue. Thus, realistically, this economic policy makes sense only
if combined with a policy for ensuring the expansion of the world economy
at a pace which will absorb the combined output of the industrial world.
Administration officials do not seem to have recognized this problem.
Even if they recognized it, it is not clear that they are in a position
either to impose or to negotiate the international order which would
resolve it. Since most regulatory systems which are feasible to envisage
conceptionally and to implement politically are built on precisely the
Keynesian model which the administration in its pursuit of competition has
abandoned, Reagan seems in fact to have precluded in advance any of the
institutional structures which would resolve the problems.
Meanwhile, in abandoning the older industrial areas, the United
States appears to be giving up the opportunity to actively pursue
the potential available in the new flexible technology of small batch
production. Elsewhere, these developments have occurred in the older
established industrial urban centers. This appears to be no accident:
the new technology requires the skilled labor force and entrepreneurial
skills available in these areas but not ordinarily in new industrial
centers. The network of small interdependent firms and the sophisticated
sense of shifting markets upon which effective exploitation of the new
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technology depends also seems to develop only in established, urban
conglomerations. The older centers of industry may of course move in this
direction without active governmental encouragement: indeed, in the
Northwest and Mid-Atlantic areas, they seem already to have done so. But
there is a very real question as to how long they can continue to buck the
costs imposed by the deteriorating urban infrastructure. To the extent
that the flexible technology developed in small batch production
ultimately becomes dominant in mass production industries, the failure of
the U.S. to keep pace in this area will ultimately handicap the industries
toward which our economic policy seems best suited as well. Indeed,
since some spillover of the technical advances in small scale production
would seem inevitable, the total abandonment of this area which the Reagan
policy taken in its face would imply cannot be optimal even in its own
terms. If small scale technology and the diversification of final demand
which it permits becomes the fulcrum of the new regulatory structure in
our principle trading partners, of course, abandonment will turn out to
have been a disaster.
The greatest risk to the implied development strategy of the Reagan
administration, however, may well be social rather than economic.
Industrialists tolerated the strong unions and elaborate social
legislation of the New Deal in the period of postwar prosperity because
they were basic to economic stability, but these institutions did not come
into being for this reason. They arose because an industrial labor force,
which in the early part of the century had been dominated by recent
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immigrants, mostly from agricultural backgrounds, in the thirties come to
be dominated by a second generation of settled, mature industrial workers.
The parental generation had accepted a system which gave management
unilateral control over wages and working conditions, but their children,
with the prospect of permanent industrial labor and without any previous
agricultural experience in terms of which industrial work might seem
especially attractive, did not. The result was the sudden explosion first
of political and then of economic organization which imposed the New Deal
and industrial unionism. The industrial labor force, to which the
Southern strategy of the mass production industries is turning is not an
immigrant work force but it is composed of people drawn out of, and still
rooted in, agricultural pursuits. In this sense, it is exactly like the
immigrants at the turn of the century. As time procedes, it too will come
to be composed of a second generation, and one can then expect
—
perhaps
just as suddenly as in the 1930 's—a revival of militant industrial
unionisms. If it is true—as the industrialists believe—that unionism is
handicapping American mass production in international competition, they
will have no choice but to go abroad. If, Southern industrial development
is our only real industrial strategy, we will then have no industry left.
Reagan's policy will have proved to be completely bankrupt in terms of all
the paths potential in the current world economy.
All of this should be particularly disturbing, because the weaknesses
of the current policy will not be apparent in the immediate future.
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If our problems are rooted in a series of serious strategic errors in
terms of long run development, they have certainly been aggravated by
tactical errors in the choice of technology and design in the automobile
and steel industries, that can be corrected simply be imitating our more
successful competitors. The decisions to do so have in fact already been
made. Their force will be enhanced by the short run effects of the
Southern strategy and the increased bargaining strength with that strategy
(along with a growing awareness of the foreign competitors) give to
management in dealing with unions in the North. As a result, the next
several years are likely to witness a resurgence of American mass
production industries in our own markets and perhaps even abroad. This
resurgence will have little to do with the policies of the Reagan
administration, but to the extent the resurgence is attributed to those
policies, and seems to affirm the Administrations' choices, it will,
—
maybe more than anything else—contribute to the country's economic demise
in the long run.
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FOOTNOTES
1. My introduction to this literature has been the work of Robert Boyer:
Boyer & Mistral (1978); Boyer (1978); Boyer (1979); Boyer (1980) and Boyer
(1981). The interpretation below differs from Boyer on two principle
points. First, it introduces a specific hypothesis about the movement of
the capitalist system through history. Boyer appears to be primarily
concerned with characterizing different regulatory regimes. Second, the
current crisis is understood in terms of a tension between the postwar
regulatory institution and the system's historic trajectory. Boyer seems
to view the crisis as the outgrowth of contradictions inherent in the
regulatory institutions themselves. [See, esp., Boyer (1981)]. See also
Aglietta, (1976).
2. It is on this particular point that I have departed from Boyer.
3. Leading examples of theories of this kind are Bowles and Gintis (1980)
who are radicals or Marxists and Thurow (1980), which is essentially a
liberal theory. A conservative version of the same argument is Bell
(1976).
4. The characterization which follows is developed in Berger and Piore
(1980) pp. 55-82, in an essay entitled, "The Technological Foundations of
Dualism and Discontinuity."
5. Note the contrast between this view and that of Joseph Schumpater. In
Schumpater's view, innovation is an act of individual will and courage.
Inventions are made by man of uncommon insight and introduced by people of
unusual determination. In the view developed above, innovations are
generated by the historical evolution of the system: the elements of
production are shifted in the evolutionary process (like the turning of a
kalidascope) enabling us to "see" things in ways that were not previously
possible. The individual innovator is thus not at all critical: if one
person did not "discover" the innovation another surely would. The
"stylized" fact of the innovative process highlighted in this view is
simultaneous discovery.
6. Much of this argument is also anticipated in Berger and Piore, (1980)
op cit.
-^
—
r
7. Morris (1964).
8. Galbraith (1967): Galbraith later broadened this view to recognize a
dual economy, but the relationship between the sectors as he views them is
rather different than that hypothesized here. Galbraith (1972) pp. 179-
214.
9. March and Simon (1958); Cyert and March (1963).
10. For example, Solow (1967).
-79-
11. Galenson (1960) and Cochran (1977).
12. Contrast with Bowles and Gintis (1980) p. 19ff.
13. I am indebted to my colleague Harry Katz who made me aware of this
agreement and helped me to appreciate its significance.
14. Eg. Hicks (1963) pp. 316-319.
15. Piore (1979).
16. Ross (1948) and Dunlop (1957).
17. Steiber (1957).
18. Ross (1948).
19. Dunlop (1957).
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